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INTRODUCTION
Like all academics, federalism scholars typically divide into
camps. Some favor state sovereignty; others favor state autonomy.
Some insist that states require formal, judicially enforceable
protections against federal intrusion; others favor the informal
protections afforded by the political process. Some favor cooperative
federalism; others are not even sure that cooperative regimes can
properly be called federalism. Scholars even divide as to the source
of state power in its ongoing competition with the national government. Some imagine states occupying a separate sphere from the
federal government.1 Others assume that some level of state-federal
integration is not just inevitable but healthy. Still others imagine
that it is useful to have states serve as fully integrated administrative units within the federal system.
When scholars write about these debates, they often write as if
we must choose between these different accounts of federalism
—that we need one theory to rule them all (with apologies to
Tolkien). It is not surprising that federalism scholarship usually
rests on this assumption. Academics mostly write about the case
law. And in a given case, one usually does have to make a choice
between one theory or another.2
In the legislative and administrative arenas, however, our choices
are far more varied. We need not hew exclusively to one vision of
federalism. We can choose all of them at once. And we do. Every
flavor of federalism can be found somewhere in our system.
Institutional structures and interactions vary dramatically from
domain to domain, program to program. Substantial variegation
can be found within the same statutory scheme.3 Indeed, even in
the judicial context, we can—and do—choose more than one vision
1. See infra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
2. Though even in the judicial setting, it would be entirely plausible for courts to adopt
different accounts of federalism in different contexts. See infra note 101 and accompanying
text.
3. See Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534 (2011)
(canvassing the many forms of federalism that can be found in the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act).
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of federalism. “Our Federalism,”4 in short, contains multitudes. It
would be more accurate to call it “Our Federalism(s).”5
It would be useful if federalism debates were more attentive to
the fact that there are many federalisms, not one. In this Article, I
identify three main reasons why federalism debates would improve
if we paid more attention to federalism’s many facets. First,
federalism debates have an all-or-nothing quality to them, as if
different accounts of federalism are mutually exclusive. Arguments
typically rest on the assumption that different forms of state power
are substitutes for one another. As a result, scholars have largely
neglected the possibility that these forms of state power can also be
complements. Sovereignty can be leveraged to give states more
power within the national policy-making process. States’ status as
administrative insiders can help them preserve their power outside
of national policymaking. It would be useful if scholars were more
attentive to the fact that the questions federalism raises need not
involve an either/or answer. Often they will involve a both/and.
Second, if we paid more attention to the many forms state power
can take, we would find there is a good deal more to say about
federalism doctrine and theory. The dominance of the sovereignty
and process federalism accounts—both of which endorse a markedly
similar view of state power—has led constitutional theory to neglect
the huge swaths of federalism in which the states and federal
government regulate together, with the states carrying out national
policy. At present, constitutional theory lacks the tools necessary to
analyze these cooperative federal regimes. But although there is a
great deal of room to write in these areas, scholars continue to
rehearse the same, tired debates over sovereignty and process
federalism that have dominated the field for decades.
Finally, greater scholarly emphasis on the many facets of
federalism would help lower the stakes in ongoing debates.
Although scholars often write as if we require one theory to rule
4. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
5. It would not be surprising that a field as complex and variegated as federalism
required more than one theory to describe it. Much of constitutional law exhibits a healthy
pluralism of this sort. For instance, while some have pushed a unitary conception of free
speech, most accept the idea that the ends of the First Amendment are plural. See, e.g.,
Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1749 n.9 (2005)
(canvassing this debate).
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them all, it is hard to believe they really mean it. Federalism
debates are best understood not as disagreements over which model
to choose but as disputes over how to strike the right balance
between different types of institutional arrangements. Such
debates, however, can only be hashed out in context—domain by
domain, policymaking arena by policymaking arena. Generic calls
for one approach or another simply cannot do the trick. Shifting the
debate along these lines would lead us to focus our attention on a
more productive set of questions. We would spend more of our time
analyzing which flavor of federalism best fits a given context and
less time pushing a single theory.
Part I of this Article maps the extant scholarship by considering
what scholars believe to be the source of state power in a federal
scheme. It discusses the three main accounts of state power put
forward by scholars: the de jure autonomy associated with the
sovereignty account; the de facto autonomy associated with process
federalism; and the power of the servant, which is the best way to
conceptualize state power in cooperative federal regimes. This Part
concludes by noting that, as a purely descriptive matter, we see
plenty of examples of each form of state power, thus belying the
notion that we need to adopt one theory to rule them all. This is
true not just of the legislative and administrative arenas but even
of the judicial one. Part II identifies the reasons why pluralism
matters—why it would be useful if federalism debates explicitly
acknowledged the existence of “Our Federalism(s)” rather than
continuing to fight about which theory should dominate “Our
Federalism.”
I. MAPPING FEDERALISM DEBATES
Federalism theory has long exhibited a healthy pluralism with
regard to the ends federalism promotes. Federalism is thought to
promote choice, competition, experimentation, and the diffusion of
power. The Supreme Court reels off these arguments as easily as
scholars do.6
6. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1991); DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 75-106 (1995); Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism:
“Converse-1983” in Context, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1229 (1994); Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young,
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The divide in federalism debates centers on the means necessary
to achieve those ends. States cannot promote choice or check an
overweening national government if they lack power. But federalism theory contains at least three distinct accounts about what
form of power states require to fulfill their role in a federalist
scheme.7
A. Sovereignty, Process Federalism, and the Exit Option
One major view of state power is conventionally labeled a sovereignty account. Sovereignty, of course, has many meanings in
many fields. Its definition varies even within federalism theory
itself. As a general matter, though, champions of sovereignty believe that federalism will succeed only if states enjoy the power to
rule without interference in a policymaking domain of their own.8
Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 136-39 (2001);
Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 774-79 (1995); Deborah Jones Merritt, The
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 3-10 (1988); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1,
53-63 (2004); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493-1511 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’
DESIGN (1987)). For the case that we reel off these arguments too easily, see Barry Friedman,
Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 318-19 (1997).
7. I have previously explored these issues in greater depth. See Heather K. Gerken,
Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010). Parts of the next
Section are drawn from this article. For a sampling of other efforts to identify the many
conceptions of federalism running through doctrine and scholarship, see, for example, Amar,
supra note 6; Randy E. Barnett, Three Federalisms, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 285 (2008); Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Assumptions of Federalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1763, 1766-69 (2006); Frank
B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, The Three Faces of Federalism: An Empirical Assessment of
Supreme Court Federalism Jurisprudence, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 741, 744 (2000); Byron Dailey,
The Five Faces of Federalism: A State-Power Quintet Without a Theory, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1243
(2001); Gluck, supra note 3; Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a
Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1563 (1994); Young, supra note 6. For a
comparative view, see Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism,
38 AM. J. COMP. L. 205 (1990).
8. This definition merges two different conceptions of sovereignty: one involves freedom
from interference (a negative right) and the other the ability to serve as a source of law and
policy (a positive right). See Young, supra note 6, at 13-14. Although the two are conceptually
different, id., many assume that freedom from interference does not amount to much unless
there is something to do with that freedom. I therefore join scholars of many stripes in fusing
these two definitions. See, e.g., Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The
Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847, 851 (1979); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back
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They thus typically imagine the state and federal governments
occupying separate regulatory spheres, with the state setting its
own policies separate and apart from the center. Proponents of
sovereignty also believe that courts ought to take a formal role in
protecting these regulatory spheres.
Sovereignty’s main opponents are the process federalists. They
argue that federalism depends on preserving the de facto autonomy
of the states, not the de jure autonomy afforded by sovereignty.
Process federalists thus look not to the courts but to politics, tradition, inertia, and interdependence as the guarantors of state
power. Consider Larry Kramer’s seminal account. In resuscitating
the “political safeguards of federalism,” he argues that states can
protect themselves from federal intrusion without judicial assistance.9 He points out, for example, that the integration of the state
and national parties ensures that local politicians have access to,
and leverage over, national politicians.10 So, too, Kramer argues
that the important role states play in administering federal policy
ensures that the national government cannot take state interests
for granted.11 The formal protections afforded by sovereignty, in
Kramer’s view, are unnecessary to preserve state power.12
Although the sovereignty account and process federalism are
typically cast in opposition to one another, in fact there are deep
continuities between them. Process federalists look to politics and
interdependence as leverage points for protecting states from
national interference, but they nonetheless conceive of power in
roughly the same way that champions of sovereignty do. The de
facto autonomy lauded by process federalists is markedly like the
de jure autonomy lauded by sovereignty’s champions. Both envision
state power as the ability to preside over one’s own empire rather
than administering someone else’s.13 Kramer, for instance, argues
that the goal of process federalism is to “preserve the regulatory
into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 220-33 (2000); Frank
I. Michelman, States’ Rights and States’ Roles: Permutations of “Sovereignty” in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1192-95 (1977).
9. Kramer, supra note 8.
10. Id. at 219.
11. Id. at 279.
12. Id. at 286.
13. See Gerken, supra note 7, at 7.
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authority of state and local institutions to legislate policy choices.”14
So, too, Ernest Young, another leading process federalist, insists
that “the independent policy-making authority of state governments
... is the critical variable” for federalism.15
Similarly, though process federalists resist the separate spheres
approach so often put forward by champions of sovereignty, a
similar conception of state power undergirds their work. Members
of both camps share the view that states should have control over
“their” policies.16 For instance, some process federalists argue, as
does Larry Kramer, that “[a]lthough it’s no longer possible to maintain a fixed domain of exclusive state jurisdiction it’s not necessarily impossible to maintain a fluid one.”17 Many other process
federalists suggest that the key to preserving state power is to
enforce restrictions on federal power.18 By limiting what the federal
14. Kramer, supra note 8, at 222; see also Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1513 (1994) (arguing that a key question for process federalism is not
whether the states will continue to exist but whether “they will have anything to do”).
15. Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1358 n.42
(2001); see also id. at 1385. For similar views, see, for example, Bradford R. Clark, The
Procedural Safeguards of Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1681, 1681 (2008) (arguing
that the procedural safeguards of federalism are “designed to preserve the governance
prerogatives of the states”); D. Bruce La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism
Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U.
L.Q. 779, 786 (1982) (arguing that federalism requires that states have “the power to make
decisions about ... the package of goods and services to be provided collectively[ ] and the
allocation of governmental resources”); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process:
The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 416 (rejecting a
purely administrative model of federalism that would transform state institutions “into an
extension of the federal bureaucratic machinery” because it would “strike at the very core of
participatory politics in the United States”).
16. See Kramer, supra note 14, at 1495-99. Similarly, although Young suggests that we
cannot identify state policymaking arenas a priori, he argues that it is essential that we leave
states with “something meaningful to do.” Young, supra note 15, at 1385; see also Ernest A.
Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3.
17. Kramer, supra note 14, at 1499.
18. Brad Clark, for instance, claims that the Supremacy Clause and the separation of
powers promote state autonomy because they limit the federal government’s reach. See
Clark, supra note 15, at 1681; Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of
Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1323 (2001) [hereinafter Clark, Separation of Powers];
Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on Federal Power, 71 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 91, 92 (2003) [hereinafter Clark, Supremacy Clause]. Stephen Gardbaum similarly
argues that federalism should be based “not on policing definitive and categorical
jurisdictional boundaries ... but on policing Congress’s deliberative processes and its reasons
for regulating.” Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV.
795, 799 (1996). So too, Vicki Jackson eschews separate spheres but still favors policing

1556

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1549

government can do, this strategy leaves space for the states to
regulate on their own.
In sum, champions of sovereignty and process federalists share
a similar vision of state power, one that emphasizes autonomy over
integration, independence over interdependence. Both turn on
providing what Albert Hirschman might have termed an “exit
option”19—making space for states to enact their own policies,
separate and apart from the center.
The similarities between these two accounts is less surprising
than one might initially think given the long and merry war
between their proponents. Roderick Hills argues that process
theories “are not really theories of federalism at all but theories of
judicial review.”20 I would put the point somewhat differently. Both
sovereignty and process federalism are theories of federalism. But
the core difference between them turns on how best to protect state
power, not on what form of state power we ought to be protecting if
federalism’s ends are to be achieved. Each is an account of what
federalism is for; they are just markedly similar accounts, with both
emphasizing the need to provide states with an opportunity to exit
from the federal system. Their differences center on the means necessary to protect that exit option, not on the end itself.
B. Cooperative Federalism and the Power of the Servant
Recently, a third model of state power has been put forward by
a burgeoning set of scholars who study cooperative federalism—
those areas in which the states and federal government regulate
together, with states implementing federal policy.21 Elsewhere I
limits on federal power. Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz
and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2231 (1998). “To make political safeguards of
federalism work,” she writes, “some sense of enforceable lines must linger.” Id. at 2228; see
also id. at 2233, 2255. Some argue that the Court has adopted a similar approach. See David
J. Barron, Fighting Federalism with Federalism: If It’s Not Just a Battle Between Federalists
and Nationalists, What Is It?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2081, 2096 (2006).
19. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 2 (1970).
20. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State
Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 821 (1998).
21. For a sampling of this work, see DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW
FROM THE STATES 162 (2d ed. 1972); MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW
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have termed this model the “power of the servant.”22 It is a vision
of state power that stands in sharp contrast to that put forward by
sovereignty’s champions and process federalists alike.
In cooperative regimes, states draw their power from their position as federal servants, not separate sovereigns.23 As administrators of the federal regime, states often have a great deal of discretion in carrying out federal policies.24 The policymaking space in
which they wield power is not the separate regulatory carve-out
imagined by champions of sovereignty and process federalists.25
Instead, state policymakers wield power in the nooks and crannies
of the administrative system.26 Their power looks more like that
wielded by a street-level bureaucrat than that exercised by a
separate and autonomous government.27
In these areas, state power depends on integration, not autonomy, on interdependence, not independence.28 States do not rule
separate and apart from the system, and the power they wield is
not their own. Instead, they serve as part of a complex amalgam of
national, state, and local actors implementing federal policy. States
thus wield the power of the insider, not the outsider.29 In these
areas, states are not exercising an exit option, but they enjoy a muscular form of voice—the power not just to complain about national
GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 60-63 (1966); John Kincaid, The Competitive
Challenge to Cooperative Federalism: A Theory of Federal Democracy, in COMPETITION
AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM
87, 106 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative
Federalism and Co-optation, 92 YALE L.J. 1344, 1346 (1983); Philip J. Weiser, Federal
Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1692, 1695-97 (2001); Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for
Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 668 (2001); Joseph F. Zimmerman, NationalState Relations: Cooperative Federalism in the Twentieth Century, PUBLIUS, Spring 2001, at
15.
22. Heather K. Gerken, Of Sovereigns and Servants, 115 YALE L.J. 2633, 2634 (2006); see
also Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J.
1256, 1265 (2009). These issues are explored in greater depth in both of these pieces as well
as in Gerken, supra note 7.
23. See Gerken, supra note 22, at 2635.
24. See id.
25. See Gerken, supra note 7, at 37.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 7.
29. See id.
OF
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policy but to set it.30 Although states are not making policy of their
own, they are part of an extremely important policy-making process
—the one the national government controls. In sum, states wield
power in cooperative federal regimes, but the power they wield is
that of the servant, not the sovereign; the insider, not the outsider;
that associated with voice, not exit.
One might, of course, wonder why this is a remotely plausible
account of state power. Is the power of the servant a form of power
at all? How important can it be to implement national policy when
compared to enacting a policy of one’s own? In a recent paper, I
have argued that the power of the servant is quite important.31 Just
ask any administrative law scholar or indeed anyone who has
written on the principal-agent problem. The power of the servant is
different from that of the sovereign, but it is power nonetheless.
Though I have canvassed this argument extensively elsewhere,32
to make the point here let me offer a small and necessarily stylistic
set of examples of why the power of the servant matters. One
reason that state servants are powerful is that the federal government depends on them to get anything done. They have a great deal
of power to resist and contest the implementation of federal law.
Think about the refusal of many states to implement federal environmental regulations, resistance that forced a policy change for the
simple reason that the federal government could not regulate
without the states.33 Or consider the ways in which California has
pushed the national government to shift its positions on emissions
standards.34 Or consider the efforts of Michigan and Wisconsin to
hijack federal welfare policy, creating model regimes that helped
pull down federal policy from within.35 Or think about the ways in
which states dramatically expanded the State Children’s Health
Insurance Program (SCHIP) in the process of administering it.36 We
30. See id. at 7-8.
31. See id. at 33-44.
32. See generally Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 22; Gerken, supra 7; Gerken,
supra note 22.
33. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 22, at 1276-77 n.64 (citing Thomas O.
McGarity, Regulating Commuters to Clear the Air: Some Difficulties in Implementing a
National Program at the Local Level, 27 PAC. L.J. 1521, 1556-61 (1996)).
34. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 22, at 1277-78.
35. See id. at 1274-76.
36. See id. at 1281-82 (citing ELICIA J. HERZ ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30473,
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see state-level variation even in routinized regulatory regimes,
including the state administration of OSHA and Social Security.37
In each of these examples, the state’s power to depart from federal
standards—to push back, even to resist—exists because the state
is inside the system, not outside it.
Servants are also powerful precisely because they can take
advantage of the web of connective tissues that binds the periphery
to the center.38 Moreover, insider status gives state officials
standing—in the colloquial sense—to challenge the center. They can
voice disagreement from within the system, base their claims on
shared expertise and experience, and cast that dissent in terms
readily comprehensible to the relevant decision makers. Further, as
Jessica Bulman-Pozen has pointed out, state servants possess not
just the opportunity to challenge federal policy but the means to do
so.39 As insiders to the policy-making process, state officials—in
contrast to most reformers—have access to the information and
expertise they need to make good on their challenges.40
Servants can also set the agenda, forcing the majority to engage
by enacting a policy the majority dislikes. Although we conventionally imagine free speech to be a sufficient channel for disagreement,
the majority always has the power not to engage with the dissenter.
Consider the iconic image of an individual exercising his First
Amendment rights: someone standing on a soap box. Most people
simply walk on by. The safest course for those who control national
policy will almost always be not to engage with dissenters. Radio
silence is a strategy used by the powerful.
States enmeshed in a federal regime thus enjoy a unique power
vis-à-vis the national government. Because they are inside the
national policymaking regime rather than outside, they can force
the majority’s engagement by implementing national policy in a
STATE CHILDREN’S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM (SCHIP): A BRIEF OVERVIEW 4-9 (2008)).
37. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the
Grammar of Governance, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES
115, 143-44 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006). See generally John T. Scholz et al., Street-Level
Political Controls over Federal Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 829 (1991).
38. See Gerken, supra note 7, at 39.
39. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers,
112 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
40. See id.
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fashion that the center would reject. So-called cooperative federalism thus allows states to engage in what Jessica Bulman-Pozen and
I have termed “uncooperative federalism.”41
Finally, state servants are powerful because they serve two
masters, not one—they have a power base that is different from
that of the federal government. The most noteworthy examples
arise when state politicians end up serving a nominally bureaucratic role. For example, Republican Governors Tommy Thompson
and John Engler were charged with administering federal welfare
law that had been enacted by a Democratic Congress.42 They used
that power not to further the statute’s goals but to create welfareto-work systems that would ultimately help topple the existing
national program.43 Even when state technocrats are the key decision makers, they often owe their appointments to political actors
who may have quite different commitments and goals than federal
decision makers.
C. Federalism(s) in Practice
The preceding Sections demonstrated that we can identify at
least three different models of state power running through federalism theory: (1) the de jure autonomy associated with the sovereignty account; (2) the de facto autonomy associated with process
federalism; and (3) the power of the servant, which is the best
account of state power within a cooperative federal regime.44
Importantly for purposes of this Article, each finds a number of
real-world cognates. For example, states enjoy something akin to
sovereignty in limited circumstances, such as when they are structuring their own governments,45 fending off federal efforts to
commandeer their staff,46 or regulating where the federal government lacks authority to act.47

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See generally Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 22.
See id. at 1274-75.
See id. at 1274-76.
See supra Parts I.A-B.
See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 563 (1911).
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997).
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
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A great deal of state regulatory activity fits the picture put
forward by those who favor the autonomy model. States enjoy
substantial regulatory power and independence in areas like
criminal law, family law, public health, election administration,
corporate law, and the like. Although the federal government can
and does occasionally intervene, for the most part national
policymakers have left these regulatory arenas to the states.
Finally, states serve as powerful federal servants in a wide swath
of policymaking arenas, including environmental law, health insurance, welfare policy, consumer protection, financial regulation,
and telecommunications. In these areas, the states are not sovereign or even autonomous in the traditional sense.48 Instead, they
serve as administrative units carrying out federal policy.
II. WHY PLURALISM MATTERS
Both in theory and practice, then, there are many federalisms,
not one. As soon as one states this point, it seems obviously true,
even banal. Yet much federalism scholarship proceeds on the
implicit assumption that we do, indeed, need one theory to rule
them all. Larry Kramer begins his article Understanding Federalism with the observation that “[t]alking about federalism feels a bit
like joining the proverbial blind men trying to describe an elephant.”49 It would be helpful if every federalism article began with
this caveat.
To be sure, the typical federalism scholar does not state explicitly
that we must have one theory to rule them all. But, as others have
48. At some level, of course, state servants enjoy autonomy in some narrow sense because
they enjoy the discretion to make decisions in implementing federal policy. But as Jessica
Bulman-Pozen and I have pointed out elsewhere:
[T]his autonomy is quite different from that typically contemplated by
federalism scholars. The servant’s power to decide is interstitial and contingent
on the national government’s choice not to eliminate it. The servant thus enjoys
microspheres of autonomy, embedded within a federal system and subject to
expansion or contraction by a dominant master. That is not the sort of
autonomy typically invoked by federalism scholars, who emphasize
separateness and independence, the state’s ability to govern without
interference from the federal government.
Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 22, at 1268.
49. Kramer, supra note 14, at 1485.
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observed,50 too often academics write as if our options were
mutually exclusive. Consider, for instance, the debate between the
champions of sovereignty and the process federalists. Presumably
because most of this debate has centered on judicial decisions,
scholars often write as if we must make a choice, once and for all,
between these two visions of state power. So, too, scholars often
write as if cooperative federalism does not exist. The problem is not
so much outright hostility toward cooperative federalism—though
there is some51—but rather benign neglect.
The cramped nature of ongoing federalism debates provides
perhaps the best evidence that academics write as if there is one
federalism, not many. Below I identify three shortcomings in current debates, all of which stem from the propensity of academics to
write as if we require one theory to rule them all.
A. Forms of State Power: Substitutes or Complements?
The debate between the advocates of the sovereignty model and
process federalists offers a good example of why scholars would do
well to pay more attention to our many federalisms. As Ernest
Young has observed, this debate has typically had an all-or-nothing
quality to it.52 As a result, scholars have long overlooked sensible,
middle-ground positions between its two poles. When scholars urge
us to adopt one theory or another, the implicit assumption behind
these arguments is that these different forms of power are substitutes for one another. Scholars usually write as if process federalism will undermine state sovereignty or vice versa.53 In some
50. See, e.g., Young, supra note 15, at 1350.
51. See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L.J. 557, 559
(2000). Some evince no hostility toward cooperative federalism but simply believe that it does
not count as federalism. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some
Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 944 (1994) (arguing that a federal
system is not one in which states function as “mere administrative units” of the federal
government); see also Rapaczynski, supra note 15, at 416 (arguing that radically limiting the
ability of states to tax would “make a mockery of the federalist concerns”). At the very least,
cooperative federal regimes are so sufficiently outside conventional understandings that even
scholars who classify these institutional arrangements as federalism nonetheless feel it
necessary to defend this view. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 18, at 2219.
52. See Young, supra note 15, at 1350.
53. See id. at 1373.
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instances, of course, this view is surely correct. But we have not
been sufficiently attentive to the possibility that these forms of
state power can also serve as complements, not just substitutes.
When the rare scholar attends to this possibility, he or she often
comes up with a sensible middle-ground proposal, and often an
influential one at that. Consider, for instance, Roderick Hills’s astute argument that granting states formal protections from certain
kinds of federal intrusions might actually serve rather than undermine the basic aims of process federalism.54 On Hills’s view,
preventing the national government from commandeering state
officials forces the national government to purchase rather than
seize state services and thus creates the right conditions for the
federal-state bargaining lauded by process federalists to take
place.55
Similarly, think about Ernest Young’s claim that judicial intervention might be helpful for process federalism. As Young observes,
“[T]he debate over judicial review has taken place at the extreme
end of the range of possible options.... [It] has generally been over
whether we should have any judicial review or none at all; between
total reliance in the political process to protect federalism or anything short of that.”56 Young suggests we rely mostly on the political
process to protect state power while keeping “some judicial review
... as an ultimate backstop.”57 He describes his proposal as a
“Democracy and Distrust for federalism doctrine—that is, a doctrine
of judicial review constructed to protect the self-enforcing nature of
the federalist system.”58
Finally, consider Timothy Zick’s argument that sovereignty
matters even in those areas in which the states and federal
government are engaged in the type of political bargaining touted
by process federalists. Zick claims that sovereignty
results in deference to and respect for states even though the
Constitution does not mandate this in express terms; even
though, in fact, Congress, for example, is not required to defer
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See Hills, supra note 20, at 816.
See id. at 819.
Young, supra note 15, at 1350.
Id. at 1351.
Id. at 1395.
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or desist. Sovereignty allows the states to bargain and negotiate
as if they occupied a position of more or less equal bargaining
power.59

As with Hills’s and Young’s arguments, this point emerges only
when one recognizes that it is possible for many forms of federalism
to coexist.
Even outside of the sovereignty/political process debate, we see
instances in which different forms of state power can serve as
complements and not just substitutes. Scholars like Larry Kramer
have written about what one might call the ex ante safeguards of
federalism—the ways in which state officials can lobby federal
officials who are passing a bill or enacting a regulation.60 Cooperative federalism, however, extends the time horizon for states to
influence federal policies.61 It gives state officials a chance to shape
federal policy after interest-based bargaining has concluded, providing what Jessica Bulman-Pozen and I have termed an “ex post
safeguard[ ] of federalism.”62 Because states are insiders to the
system, they have more than one bite at the apple63: they can
influence federal policy when the statutes or regulation is passed,
and they can influence federal policy once the scheme is put in place
by virtue of the fact that they administer it.64
B. The Neglect of Cooperative and Uncooperative Federalism
Here is another example of a scholarly blind spot in federalism
debates: constitutional theory’s out-and-out neglect of the constitutional dimensions of cooperative federalism. Public law scholars and
social scientists have long paid attention to cooperative federalism,

59. Timothy Zick, Are the States Sovereign?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 229, 333-34 (2005). Ernie
Young has similarly argued that sovereignty can play a useful role in maintaining the models
of federalism that are typically cast as antithetical to the sovereignty model (process
federalism, cooperative federalism, and the like) and urges scholars to recognize
sovereignty’s utility outside the ambit of dual federalism. Ernest A. Young, The Puzzling
Persistence of Dual Federalism (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
60. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 14, at 1493; see also Kramer, supra note 8, at 279.
61. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 22, at 1292.
62. For further exploration of this idea, see id.
63. Id. at 1293.
64. See id.
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but constitutional theory has been slow to absorb these insights.65
It has instead been modeled on the idea that states enjoy power by
virtue of having an exit option, the ability to regulate separate and
apart from the national government.66 This vision of state power—
shared by process federalists and sovereignty types alike—turns on
autonomy and separateness rather than interdependence and
integration, which are the hallmarks of cooperative federalism.67
Constitutional theory rests on the assumption that federalism is
intended to give states regulatory power over their own domains;68
cooperative federalism, in sharp contrast, features a powerful
national government with its finger in every pie and states wielding
power that is not their own.69 Constitutional theory emphasizes the
importance of preserving an exit option for the states; cooperative
federalism turns states into insiders, not outsiders.70 As a result,
constitutional law scholars have not just neglected cooperative
federal regimes—some have gone so far as to question whether such
regimes can be properly classified as federalism in the first place.71
Because of this neglect, constitutional theory lacks the tools it
needs to analyze cooperative federal regimes. In these administrative structures, states are servants, not sovereigns or even autonomous entities.72 States are not presiding over their own empires;
they are administering someone else’s. Even in the areas in which,
at first glance, states seem to enjoy a robust form of autonomy, in
fact they are often regulating in the microspheres left open by
federal law.73
Recently, a small but burgeoning group of scholars has begun to
argue that constitutional theory requires new conceptual tools to

65. For an in-depth analysis of this idea, see generally Gerken, supra note 7.
66. See id. at 7.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 19.
70. See id. at 14.
71. See, e.g., Rubin & Feeley, supra note 51, at 944. But see Jackson, supra note 18, at
2219 (“A federal system might simply provide for the existence of two levels of government,
with independently elected leaderships, in which the national-level government had plenary
legislative jurisdiction and the subnational level had principal administrative responsibilities.”).
72. See Gerken, supra note 7, at 14.
73. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 22, at 1268.
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analyze cooperative federal regimes.74 Much of this work emphasizes the ways in which cooperative federal regimes promote the
same aims as federalism even though the power states wield looks
nothing like the model that dominates constitutional theory. Just
as constitutional theorists argue that an exit option allows states to
serve as laboratories of democracy, sources of innovation, and regulatory rivals, scholars have recently pointed out that joint regulation can promote mutual learning, healthy competition, and useful
redundancy.75
My own work has examined the uncooperative dimensions of
cooperative federalism and the administrative dimensions of these
bureaucratic arrangements. It has thus limned the ideas that make
up the other half of constitutional theory—those that emphasize the
role that states can play in shaping identity, promoting democracy,
and diffusing power.76
Let me provide several examples in which the dominance of the
exit paradigm—the notion of state power that runs through both
the sovereignty model and process federalism—has limited our
intellectual resources for working through a set of problems that
often arise in the context of federalism debates. The first goes to the
oft-stated claim that one of the purposes of federalism is to check
the national government.77 Indeed, it is commonplace to argue that
national power is diffused in two ways, one horizontal and one vertical. But there is a curious difference between the ways we understand these institutional arrangements. At the horizontal level, we
have long had two competing theories about how to check a government.78 The first, separation of powers, depends on autonomy
and independence. Power is diffused by having institutional actors
swim in their own lanes and carry out policy in their own independent spheres. The second, checks and balances, depends on integra74. See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 7, at 19-20 & n.50 (discussing this work).
75. See id. at 20.
76. For further discussion, see id.
77. This argument is drawn from Gerken, supra note 7, at 33.
78. These arguments are rooted in the competing positions articulated by Montesquieu
and Madison. Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 318 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 2003), with MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 156-66 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds.
& trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748). For an overview of the contemporary debate,
see generally M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA.
L. REV. 1127 (2000).
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tion and interdependence. Power is diffused by creating a messy
structure of overlapping institutions that depend on one another to
get anything done.
One model dominates the debate on the vertical diffusion of
power: the exit account endorsed by process federalists and sovereignty types alike.79 This exit account is the natural cognate to the
separation of powers. Both turn on the notion that power diffusion
hinges on independence, not interdependence. And both turn on
formal accounts of separate policymaking spheres. Both envision
power as the ability to control one’s own empire. Both tend to focus
on who gets to play the trump card when the center and periphery
tussle—when the trick is to figure out who possesses which power,
and the game ends when the trump card is played.
Absent from federalism theory is a fully theorized competing
approach, the cognate to the checks-and-balances model. We do not
think of voice—not even the muscular form of voice that allows for
rebellious state policymaking—as a strategy for checking the
national government. That is true even though the states and the
federal government are often as integrated as the three branches.
And yet we continue to emphasize federalism’s hierarchical dimensions rather than imagining federal-state relations as we do the
relations between the three branches—as a system that mixes
conflict and cooperation to produce governance.
If we imagine states checking the center by exercising a muscular
form of voice—challenging and resisting federal law from within
rather than making policy outside of it—the salience of the checksand-balances model becomes evident. As with the checks-andbalances model,80 an account of federalism oriented around voice
would suggest that power relations are contingent and fluid, so
debates over jurisdicitional lines are, in some senses, beside the
point.81 And the inquiry does not end—as it does with an exit
79. See supra text accompanying note 19.
80. Cf. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 603 (1984) (“The imprecision inherent in the
definition and separation of the three governmental powers contributes to the tensions
among them.”).
81. Alex Aleinikoff and Robert Cover begin with a very different example—federal-state
interactions in the habeas context—but propose a similar conception of federalism, one
“premised upon conflict and indeterminacy ... in which neither system can claim total
sovereignty.” Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas
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account of federalism and the separation of powers82—with the conclusion that one institution gets to trump another.83 Cogovernance
is instead the model: an ongoing, iterated game in which what
matters is how the two institutions partner with one another. The
key is not to figure out who wins but to figure out how to maintain
a healthy tension between state and national institutions.
Just to ground this a bit more, let me give a concrete example of
the potential payoff associated with thinking in these terms. There
is a seemingly endless debate on how to strike the balance of power
between the states and federal government.84 Those who worry
about state power almost invariably propose an exit option:
enlarging the policymaking empires over which states preside. And
although some—like the dissenters in the anticommandeering
cases85—invoke the interests of the state in challenging an exit-like
solution, they do not even have a vocabulary to make that claim, let
alone a familiar set of arguments to rehearse. In Printz v. United
States86 and New York v. United States,87 for instance, the majority
drew upon a deeply intuitive, historically rooted argument about
the value of sovereignty, of preserving an exit option for the states.
While the dissenters were feeling their way around some of the
arguments I have discussed, they made those arguments piecemeal
instead of drawing upon a well-established doctrinal analogue like
checks and balances in making their case.88

Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1048 (1977).
82. Cf. ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 94 (2009) (“Dualist federalism is a zero sum game, a battle over
territory that demands a victor.”).
83. Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1736 (1996)
(arguing that the checks-and-balances approach simply focuses on “maintaining a basic
equilibrium among the branches” rather than on allocating particular powers to particular
branches); cf. Strauss, supra note 80, at 604 (arguing that the checks-and-balances approach
reflects “a process not an institution, with impermanence of resolution not only inevitable
but desirable as an outcome”).
84. See supra Part I.
85. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 943 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“There can be no conflict between ... duties to the state and those owed to the Federal
Government because Article VI unambiguously provides that federal law ‘shall be the
supreme Law of the Land,’ binding in every state.”).
86. Id. at 918-19 (majority opinion).
87. 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992).
88. See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 946-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Here is another example in which constitutional theory has
missed an important insight due to its neglect of cooperative
federalism. Scholars have argued that the separation of powers
safeguards federalism.89 But no one has thought to argue the reverse. That is unsurprising given the dominance of the exit model
in federalism debates. Within constitutional theory, states are
simply understood to be outside of the national system and thus
irrelevant to the distribution of power among the three branches of
the federal government.90
Jessica Bulman-Pozen, however, has recently argued that in
cooperative federal regimes, states can play an important role in
maintaining the balance of power and checking a too-powerful
executive branch.91 Because states help administer federal policy,
they can serve as “champions of Congress, both relying on congressionally conferred authority and casing themselves as Congress’s
faithful agents.”92 As Bulman-Pozen observes,
when we turn our attention to cooperative federalism, the
distinctive way states foster the separation of powers becomes
visible. Cohabitating a statutory scheme with the federal
executive, states challenge not the raw exercise of federal power,
as traditional accounts of federalism would have it, but rather
the faithfulness of the executive to the statutory scheme.93

It is not just constitutional theory that would benefit from greater
attention to cooperative federalism. Consider the work of Abbe
Gluck in the field of legislation.94 Whereas the work described above
concerns the distribution of power between the states and federal
government, Gluck’s work attends to the interpretive questions that
arise in cooperative federal regimes. For instance, in Intrastatutory
Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of
Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, Gluck argues that
legislation theory and doctrine have simply neglected the fact that
“[e]very branch of state government is ... in the midst of creating,
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See, e.g., Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 18, at 1323-26.
See Gerken, supra note 7, at 34.
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 39.
Id. (manuscript at 3).
Id.
See Gluck, supra note 3.
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implementing and interpreting federal statutory law.”95 As a result
of this neglect, writes Gluck, “we have virtually no doctrines or
theories that acknowledge, much less account for, the role of state
implemented in the hermeneutical project of federal statutory
construction,” nor “do we have any doctrines that recognize, much
less negotiate, the relationship between state and federal agencies”
with concurrent authority.96
Gluck’s work on cooperative federalism even offers a potential
lesson for constitutional theory. Adam Cox has argued that the best
explanation for the Court’s anticommandeering rule is as an expressive norm, one that “preserv[es] and reinforc[es] public perception of the states as credible alternative political institutions.”97
Interestingly, Gluck sees expressive dimensions in cooperative
regimes, which arguably fall at the other end of the state power
spectrum. She argues that federal regimes that allow for both staterun and federal-run programs have expressive dimensions because
they acknowledge the states’ traditional role in regulating in a
policy arena even as the federal government moves into it.98 In this
way, she claims, these schemes can be both “boundary shifting” and
“federalism respecting.”99
What is noteworthy about all of this work is how recent it is.
Cooperative federalism has long been a subject of scholarly attention, but it is only recently that constitutional theory has paid
attention to the ways in which cooperative regimes serve as sources
of innovation and regulatory competition. We have thought about
the role states play in checking the national government since
Madison, but it is only recently that we have paid attention to the
uncooperative dimensions of cooperative federalism. We have spent
decades identifying the best institutional strategies for checking a
powerful executive, but it is only in 2011 that a scholar directed our
attention to the role states can play in doing so. We have long
written about the ways that federal administrative agencies inter-

95. Id. at 537.
96. Id. at 537-38.
97. Adam B. Cox, Expressivism in Federalism: A New Defense of the Anti-Commandeering
Rule?, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1309, 1312 (2000).
98. Gluck, supra note 3, at 585.
99. Id. at 586.
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pret federal law, but the ways in which states’ agents do so had
been neglected until last year.
C. Context, Not Contests
One might respond that even if federalism scholars have
neglected certain topics in the field, that neglect has been benign.
On this view, federalism scholars should write as if we require one
theory to rule them all. Much of federalism scholarship has
centered on the case law. And in a given case, of course, courts
typically do end up choosing one theory or another.
That answer, however, strikes me as insufficient. In the legislative and administrative arenas, there is no requirement that we
adhere to a single model of federalism. And, indeed, we do not. As
noted above,100 every flavor of federalism can be found somewhere
in our system. We talk about “Our Federalism,” but in fact it would
be more accurate to describe our system as “Our Federalism(s).”
Scholars may even overestimate how important it is for the courts
to hew to a single theory of federalism. The Court has cycled
between theories of federalism for the last forty years. Although the
result has been some embarrassingly inconsistent opinions, one
could certainly imagine an intellectually coherent account for why
the Court would invoke the sovereignty model in some instances
and an autonomy model in others.101 So, too, one could easily
imagine thinking differently about federal-state relations in the
context of cooperative federalism than one does in the context of
more conventional federal-state interactions.
I suppose one might reject pluralism on the ground that there is
only one theory of federalism that adequately protects state power.
Needless to say, such an argument would involve an extremely
strong causal claim. To make such a claim, one would need to show
not just that one’s theory is superior in a given context but that it
100. See supra text accompanying notes 9-12.
101. For example, even ardent process federalists are willing to stipulate to the notion
that states require some basic attributes of sovereignty that are enforceable in court. Some
scholars believe that we need a guarantee that the national government will not respond to
state challenges by dissolving the states and argue that such a guarantee defines the metes
and bounds of federalism. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and
Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1335-44 (1994);
Jackson, supra note 28, at 2217-19; Rapaczynski, supra note 15, at 362.
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is superior across enough contexts to justify its adoption. Moreover,
given that our current system embraces many forms of state power,
one would also have to have some kind of account to explain why we
have not yet gone to hell in a handbag.
I doubt that most scholars, when pressed, would insist on making
claims as strong as these. Sovereignty types would surely acknowledge that not every area in which states regulate needs to be
protected by formal rules.102 Proponents of process federalism would
surely recognize that the states require at least some formal
protections against federal intrusion.103 And although cooperative
federalism has had an uneasy relationship with constitutional
theory, few are interested in calling for its abolition.104
Instead, scholars’ claims are best understood not as strong causal
claims about the imperatives associated with one vision of federalism or another but as claims about how best to balance these three
models of state power. The arguments are not about which theory
ought to rule them all but about whether and when courts or
policymakers should put their thumb on one side of the scale or the
other.
Even here, we can see the impulse to emphasize one theory over
others. These claims are typically cast as arguments for “more”
sovereignty protections or “less” reliance on the courts to police
federal-state relations. This type of argument, though, inevitably
boils down to claims about balancing costs and benefits. Such
arguments are thus highly likely to turn on contingency and
context; it is hard to imagine resolving any such debate at the high
level of generality at which these arguments are typically pitched.
Scholars ought to spend more time on context and contingency.
After all, any argument about the need for “more” of one approach
or another implicitly assumes that it is acceptable for some federalstate interactions to fall outside one’s preferred model. Once one
has offered that concession, it is hard to imagine that one could
write sensibly about the right outcome in a given case without
taking into account the policymaking arena in which one operates.

102. See, e.g., Zick, supra note 59, at 333-34.
103. See, e.g., Young, supra note 15, at 1350, 1395; see also sources cited supra note 101.
104. But see Greve, supra note 51, at 559.
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And yet scholars continue to make these arguments in markedly
generic terms.105
Were scholars to write in this more pluralist vein, arguments
about federalism would be less about contests and more about
context. We would not see intellectual death matches between
different accounts of state power but would instead encounter
nuanced claims about what form of state power is most appropriate
in a given circumstance. Debates would involve not an either/or but
a both/and.
CONCLUSION
Federalism debates have long proceeded on the assumption that
we require one theory to rule them all. The premise is questionable,
and the results have been at least mildly disappointing. Although
we have certainly had a full vetting of some issues in constitutional
theory, we have missed too much. Because scholarship has proceeded on the assumption that different forms of state power are
substitutes for one another, we have not thought hard enough about
the ways in which they might be complements. Because scholars
have focused so heavily on state sovereignty and autonomy, we have
missed the many ways in which the states’ roles as servants can
serve the overarching goals of federalism. Because debates about
federalisms have been pitched as contests between different theories, we have not paid sufficient attention to the context in which
one account or another is most likely to succeed. Perhaps now is the
time to think harder about Larry Kramer’s elephant metaphor.106
Such an approach would certainly be more in keeping with the
spirit of federalism scholarship generally. One of the most deeply
admirable things about federalism scholars is that they recognize
that the ends of federalism are plural. It is thus odd that so many
members of the field still spend an inordinate amount of time
writing as if there is only one means to those varied ends. A wee bit
of pluralism on the means side of the debate would be most
welcome.

105. I have done so myself. See Gerken, supra note 7, at 71.
106. See supra text accompanying note 49.

